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Introduction 
Over the years the role of the State has changed, it has evolved. Today, the 
State has not just regulatory or authoritative (eg police, military) powers. The 
State in its current form deals with private enterprises, enters into commercial 
transactions, gets loans and establishes investment agreements. It is a State-
provider for its nationals, which participates in the global market in terms of 
private economy. Some of these State functions are exercised and fulfilled by 
State-owned companies, which are established solely for this purpose. 
The aforementioned commercial activities of State are carried out under 
contracts, which, in many cases contain an arbitration clause, providing for 
arbitration as a means of resolving any legal dispute, which may arise under 
these contracts. The preference of the arbitration instead of the courts should 
not be surprising, taking into account that arbitration has gained ground over 
the years and is considered to be the preferred method of resolving 
international commercial. As in the contracts between private persons, so in 
the contracts between a State or State entity and a private party, the 
arbitration clause is not activated if both parties fulfill their contractual 
obligations. However, in case of initiation of arbitration proceedings on behalf 
of the private party, because of the breach of the contract by the State or State 
entity, the latter has some weapons, which are proved to be sometimes very 
effectively, in order to avoid its participation in the arbitration proceedings or 
the enforcement of the arbitral award issued against them. 
In many cases, States and State entities invoke State immunity or 
incapacity to enter into an arbitration agreement under their internal law. In 
particular, State immunity has two forms: jurisdictional immunity, which 
limits the adjudicatory power of national courts or arbitral tribunals and 
immunity from execution, which restricts the enforcement powers of national 
courts or other organs. As stated “it is an axiom of international law that foreign 
States should be immune from suit in the national tribunal unless they expressly or 
12 
 
impliedly waive their immunity and submit to the jurisdiction”1. Therefore the 
question that arises is whether the arbitration agreement constitutes a valid 
and binding waiver of immunity and establishes the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it must be examined whether the waiver of 
immunity from enforcement measures can be inferred implicitly by 
arbitration agreement or requires a separate declaration by the State or State 
entity.  
On the other hand, incapacity equals to inability of a State or State entity to 
validly bind itself by an arbitration agreement.  It is not unusual the States to 
invoke their incapacity to enter into an arbitration agreement after its 
conclusion and, usually, at the time that arbitration proceedings begin.  Does 
this tactics constitute an abusive application of State’s internal law against the 
legal rights and good faith of the other contracting private party or is the only 
and legal way to restore the legality that was disrupted by the signing of the 
arbitration agreement? 
The objective of this dissertation thesis is to examine whether State 
immunity and State’s or State entity’s incapacity to conclude an arbitration 
agreement are obstacles to arbitration proceedings, by presenting the  position 
of the relevant jurisprudence of national and international courts and arbitral 
tribunals and the basic legal instruments regulating these issues at national 
and international level. 
Part I  The sovereignty of the State as an obstacle to arbitration 
1. The principle of State immunity 
Although the main and common characteristics of sovereign States are not 
clearly defined by the theorists, the Montevideo Convention on rights and 
duties of States of 1933 considers that all sovereign states have (a) a 
permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with other States2. These are the elements that 
compose the sovereignty of a State, regardless the dimensions, number of 
                                                          
1 Edwin D. Dickinson, “Waiver of State Immunity” The American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul., 1925), pp. 555-559 
2 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of  1933, Article 1 
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people, or form of its government. Indeed, a United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution declared that neither small size, nor remote 
geographical location, nor limited resources constitutes a valid objection to 
sovereign statehood3.  
The sovereign States are judicially equal, pursuant to article 2 paragraph 1 
of the Charter of the United Nations. From the principle of sovereign equality 
derives the rule of State immunity, which was adopted by the International 
Law Commission as a customary international law4.  States have incorporated 
the principle of sovereign immunity into their domestic legal order in two 
ways: domestic courts do not exercise jurisdiction in actions brought against 
foreign states; and States have allowed foreign States a privilege, as a matter 
of comity, to appear as plaintiffs in domestic courts, if they so choose5.  
The close link between the principle of sovereign equality and the 
principle of State immunity is clearly stated in a recent Judgment of 
International Court of Justice6 as follows: “this principle [of State immunity] 
has to be viewed together with the principle that each State possesses sovereignty over 
its own territory and that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the 
State over events and persons within that territory. Exceptions to the immunity of the 
State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality. Immunity may 
represent a departure from the principle of territorial sovereignty and the jurisdiction 
which flows from it”. 
State immunity has been pleaded by the States and State entities in order 
also to avoid their obligations under the contracts or transactions that they 
have entered into, to stop court or arbitral proceedings against them or to 
avoid the enforcement of an arbitral award or judgment.  
                                                          
3
 Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck (1996). What constitutes the sovereign state?. 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 22,Issue 04, pp 381-404. 
doi:10.1017/S0260210500118637. 
4 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, Vol. II (2), p. 147, para. 26 
5 Schreiber v. Federal Republic of Germany, [2002] Supreme Court Reports (SCR), Vol. 3, p. 
269, paras. 33-36 
6
 German v. Italy-Greece Intervening, Judgment of 3 February 2012 of International Court of 
Justice,  available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf 
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The rule of State immunity is regarded as proportionate restriction of the 
right on effective judicial protection7, taking into account that extending 
immunity to another State regularly has the legitimate aim of complying with 
the relevant principles of international law8. Therefore, measures taken by the 
Contracting States of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which 
reflect generally recognised rules of public international law cannot in 
principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction9. 
Nevertheless, the courts must not grant, automatically, the foreign State 
immunity, without examining the merits of the case and, especially, without 
examining if the foreign State acted as “imperium” or performed private law 
actions. In Oleynikov v. Russia case, the European Court of Human Rights 
held that “the domestic courts did not undertake any analysis of the nature of the 
transaction underlying the claim” and “thus made no effort to establish whether the 
claim related to acts of [North Korea] performed in the exercise of its sovereign 
authority or as a party to a transaction of a private law nature”  and therefore “the 
Russian courts failed to preserve a reasonable relationship of proportionality and 
impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to court”10. 
2. Absolute and restrictive approach of the principle of State immunity 
The scope and extent of the rule of State immunity vary depending on the 
nature of State’s acts. More specifically, in respect of sovereign or public acts 
(acta jure imperii), States enjoy absolute immunity, whereas in respect of 
commercial or private-law acts (acta jure gestionis) States have limited the 
immunity which they claim for themselves and which they accord to others11 
                                                          
7 Kalogeropoulou and others v. Greece and Germany, Application No. 59021/00, Decision of 
12 December 2002 of the European Court of Human Rights, ECHR Reports 2002-X, p. 417, see 
also Al- Adsani v. United Kingdom, Application No. 35763/97, ECHR Rep. 2001-XI, § 53 
8
 Theodor JR Schilling. 2014. "The Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
Immunity of States" The SelectedWorks of Theodor JR Schilling 
available at: http://works.bepress.com/theodor_schilling/10 
9
 McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], Application No. 31253/96, Judgment of 21 November 2001 of 
the European Court of Human Rights, ECHR Reports 2001-XI, p. 39 
10 Oleynikov v. Russia (Application no. 36703/04) Judgment of 14 March 2013 of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Press release issued by the Registrar of the Court, ECHR 
079 (2013) 14.03.2013 
11 That approach has also been followed in the United Nations Convention and the European 
Convention (see also the draft Inter-American Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of 
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(restrictive immunity). The principle of absolute immunity reflects a 
“ s t ru ct ur a l i s t”  a pp roa ch  ( ra t io ne  personae), which is concerned with 
the status of the party claiming sovereign immunity. On the contrary, the 
principle of restrictive immunity reflects the “f u n c t i o n a l i s t ”  
a p p r o a c h  (ratione materiae), which is concerned with the subject matter 
(e.g., the conduct) forming the basis for the claim of sovereign immunity.  The 
necessity of the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
and the exclusion of the latter from immunity are analyzed in Dralle v 
Government of Czechoslovakia case12, where the Austrian Supreme Court 
observed: “This subjection of the acta jure gestionis to the jurisdiction of the States 
has its basis in the development of the commercial activity of the States. The classic 
doctrine of immunity arose at a time when all commercial activities of States in 
foreign countries were connected with their political activities, either by the purchase 
of commodities for their diplomatic representatives abroad or by the purchase of 
material for war purposes.  Therefore, there was no justification for any distinction 
between private transactions and acts of sovereignty. Today the position is entirely 
different; States engage in commercial activity and, as the present case shows, enter 
into competition with their own nationals and with foreigners. Accordingly, the 
classic doctrine of immunity has lost its meaning and, ratione cessante, can no longer 
be recognized as a rule of international law”. 
The result of addressing the exercise of any State activity as a practice of 
State sovereignty was the preference of absolute approach, as shown by the 
jurisprudence of several courts.  In Le Gouvernement espagnol v. Casaux 
case, the Cour de Cassation granted the Spanish government immunity from 
jurisdiction on the basis of the reciprocal independence of sovereign states, by 
rejecting the attempted distinction between “Etat puissance publique” (state 
as a public power) and “Etat personne privee” (state as a private person). The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
States drawn up by the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American 
States in 1983 (ILM, Vol. 22, p. 292) 
12
 Dralle v Government of Czechoslovakia, Judgment of 10 May 1950 of Austrian Supreme 
Court; an English translation of the judgment is given in the UN Publication ST/LEG/SER.B/20 
at page 183; See also, B. Sen, “A diplomat’s handbook of International law and Practice-Third 
Revised Edition”, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher (1988), p. 465 
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Court held that any and all contractual obligations of a foreign State, 
regardless of the nature, are immune from jurisdiction13.   
As States became involved in commercial activities, some national courts 
began to apply a more restrictive law of immunity by reference to the type of 
activity carried out by the state14. The restrictive immunity recognized by 
some national courts in such cases was treated as confined to acta jure 
gestionis. In Companie des chemins de fer Liégeois Limbourgeois case, the 
plaintiff company sued for reimbursement of sums advanced by it to the 
Netherlands government under a contract for the enlargement of a railway 
station in the Netherlands. The Belgian Court de Cassation held that, when a 
State was not exercising public power but was acting like a private person 
pursuant to private law then it could not enjoy immunity15. In another case, 
the Austrian Supreme Court used not the private nature of State’s wrongful 
acts but the place, where these acts happened, as criterion for grounding 
court’s jurisdiction and denying the foreign State’s immunity. More 
specifically, in a suit against the United States for damages inflicted by a car 
owned by the United States and driven by a United States embassy agent, the 
Austrian Supreme Court entered judgment against the United States and 
justified it as follows: "There exists no doubt that the foreign government  could sue 
a local citizen in a local court for damages to its vehicle arising out of an accident.... 
The matter lies differently with a local citizen. The latter would be left remediless vis-
a-vis the foreign State ... !”.16 Moreover, in X. v Iran case the German Federal 
Constitutional Court adopted the restrictive approach and set the criteria, 
which characterize the act jure gestionis as follows: “As a means for determining 
the distinction between act jure imperii and act jure gestionis one should rather refer 
                                                          
13
 Andrew Reish, “The Status of State trading entities in France”, Law and Contemporary 
problems, (1972) Vol. 37 No. 4, available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol37/iss4/ 
14 Joanne Foakes and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, “State Immunity: The United Nations Convention 
and its effect” Chatham House, INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAMME ILP BP 05/01 available 
at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/ 
International%20Law/bpstateimmunity.pdf 
15
 Xiaodong Yang, State immunity in international law, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 
13 
16 Holoubek v. United States,2 Ob. 243.60, 84 Juristische Blätter (Wien), Vol. 84, 1962, p. 43;  
ILR (Sup. Ct. of Austria 1961) 
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to the nature of the State transaction or the resulting legal relationships and not to the 
motive  or purpose of the State activity.  It thus depends on whether the foreign State 
has acted in exercise of its sovereign authority, that is in public law or as a private 
person, that is in private law”17.  
After the growing acceptance of restrictive immunity approach, United 
Nations finalized its own restrictive approach to State immunity through UN 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their property18. This 
Convention avoided setting the criteria, which distinguish acta jure gestionis 
from acta jure imperii and, instead, listed the category of acts that constitute 
an exception to immunity. Generally, these exceptions include personal 
injury, damage of property, contracts of employment, commercial 
transactions, intellectual and industrial property, participation in companies, 
ships owned by State and ownership of property19.  
The restrictive approach was clearly adopted by the Federal State 
Immunity Act, according to section 1605 (a) (2) of which “a foreign state shall 
not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in 
any case — ……. (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon 
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States”. The same position is reflected in article 3 of State immunity Act 1978, 
which provides that “a State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to (a)a 
commercial transaction entered into by the State; or (b)an obligation of the State 
which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial transaction or not) falls to be 
performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom”. 
3. State entity as a means of conducting commercial transactions of the 
State 
                                                          
17 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes (Tubingen), vol. 16 (1964), p.27; 
International Law Reports (London), vol.45 (1972), p.57 
18
 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their property, passed by UN 
General Assembly on 2 December 2004 
19 Magdalena Forowicz, “The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human 
Rights”, Oxford University Press, 2010, p.285 
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The State, in its modern form, may exercise its powers and serve its own 
purposes through State enterprises, organs or agencies, which deal with 
private persons and draw up agreements with them. Under these conditions, 
two issues arise. Firstly, can State entities invoke State immunity? Secondly, 
are the contracts signed only by State entities binding for the States? 
3.1. The principle of State immunity invoked by State entities 
 The distinction between the absolute and restrictive immunity theories is 
also reflected in the protection extended to State entities as an extension of a 
State’s sovereignty.   
According to the structuralist approach, State entities are entitled to 
immunity when they are organically linked to the State. Criteria for 
establishing this link with the State are the public form of the entity, the extent 
of government control over the entity, the entity’s ability to own and manage 
property. A strict structuralist approach will lead to absolute immunity if the 
entity is established as a public entity that is inseparable from the State. Then, 
everything the entity does will be entitled to immunity20. Therefore, the 
creation of a separate State entity gives rise to a presumption that the entity is 
effectively separate from the State and, thus, the fact that a State entity has a 
distinct legal personality would defeat any claim to immunity21. Yet, there are 
cases, in which the court did not consider the separate legal personality of a 
State entity as legal ground to deny immunity. The landmark decision 
regarding immunity from suit of a state enterprise was handed down in 1949 
in the case of Krajina v. The Tass Agency. In that case, plaintiff instituted a 
libel action against defendant, which published a weekly newspaper in the 
U.K.. Tass, after entering a conditional appearance, applied to set aside 
plaintiff's writ on the ground that it was a department of the Soviet 
government entitled to immunity from suit. The Soviet ambassador certified 
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that the agency constituted a department, although it was empowered to 
exercise the rights of a legal entity. The Court of Appeal allowed dismissal of 
the action, holding that even if Tass was a governmental department enjoying 
a separate legal status, it did not automatically follow that it was deprived of 
the right to assert sovereign immunity22. 
The functionalist approach focuses primarily on the nature of the 
transaction at issue, not on the status or structure of the foreign entity. An 
entity carrying out a sovereign act is immune regardless of its public or 
private status23. In a very recent case, the Australian High Court clarified the 
prerequisites, under which a State entity enjoys immunity. The criteria that 
the Court used in order to determine whether an individual or a corporation 
is a separate entity of a foreign State, are: ownership, control, the functions 
which the corporation performs, the foreign State’s purposes in supporting 
the corporation, and the manner in which the corporation conducts itself or its 
business. Thus, courts must not treat ownership and control as determinative, 
but will also consider factors such as the foreign State's purposes in 
supporting the entity. All these elements must be taken into account to 
answer the question “whether the corporation or individual is being used to achieve 
some purpose for that State in the relevant circumstances”. In case of a positive 
answer the State entity enjoys jurisdictional immunity24. 
The functionalist approach was adopted by the UN Convention of 
Jurisdiction Immunities of States and their Property, which in article 2 
paragraph 1b (iii) provides that the term State means agencies or 
instrumentalities of the State and other entities, including private entities, but 
only to the extent that they are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of 
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prerogative ‘de la puissance publique’. Beyond or outside the sphere of acts 
performed by the exercise of the sovereign authority of the State, they do not 
enjoy any jurisdictional immunity. 
3.2. The extension of the binding force of contracts signed by State 
entities to the non-signatory States 
The extension of the binding force of contacts signed by State entities to 
the States plays an important role when these State entities are not vested 
with the legal right to own and dispose of assets and, as a consequence, the 
execution of arbitral awards, rendered against them, becomes impossible. 
Arbitral tribunals and courts have many times faced this issue. One can 
distinguish between two distinct lines of jurisprudence – one seeking to 
extend the applicability of the arbitration clause to the non-signatory “core” 
State, and another one seeking to respect the corporate veil between the 
“core” State and State agencies and instrumentalities, when they possess a 
separate legal personality25.  
Sometimes, the States express in a written form their intention to be bound 
by contracts signed by their State entities. Svenska case26 is one such case. 
Svenska, a Swedish company concluded an agreement with a Lithuanian 
State-owned entity, which provided for arbitration in Denmark under the 
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and contained an express 
irrevocable waiver of all sovereign immunity rights by the Lithuanian 
government and the State-owned entity. The Lithuanian government was not 
a signatory party, though it had manifested its intention in writing to be 
bound as if it were a signatory. After a dispute arose, Svenska referred to 
arbitration against both the later privatized entity and the Lithuanian 
government and succeeded in getting an award in its favour. Later, Svenska 
sought to enforce the award in UK. During the court proceedings the 
Lithuanian government invoked State immunity due to the fact that it was not 
a signatory party to the contract contained the arbitration clause and, 
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therefore, it had never waived its immunity. After analyzing the parties' 
common intentions, which it considered the correct approach under the 
applicable Lithuanian law, the Court of Appeal held that the Lithuanian 
government was bound by the arbitration agreement27.  
The existence of a Government’s member’s signature in a contract 
concluded between a private party and a State entity is not sufficient to prove 
that the Government agreed to be a contracting party and to submit any 
dispute to arbitration.  That is illustrated in Pyramids Plateau case. In this 
case, the Government of Egypt, represented by the Minister of Tourism, had 
signed with South Pacific Properties (SPP) and Egyptian General 
Organisation for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH) the “heads of agreement” as a 
party but these contained no arbitration clause. The final joint venture 
agreement, which contained such a clause – providing for ICC arbitration in 
Paris – was signed by SPP and EGOTH. The Minister of Tourism added his 
signature in this joint venture agreement and a notation that he had 
“approved, agreed and ratified” the document28. The Court of Appeal faced 
the issue whether the Minister of Tourism’s signature was sufficient to create 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Government. The Court annulled the 
award given in favour of SPP on the ground that Arab Republic of Egypt was 
not a party to the arbitration agreement29 because the Minister’s signature 
under the words “approved, agreed and ratified” did not imply the 
Government’s intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement. 
 In other cases, when the State did not expressly consent to be bound by an 
arbitration agreement signed between a State entity and a private party, it is 
not always easy to identify the required legal connection and dependence of  
the signatory State entity by the State. In Bridas case, the US District Court 
held that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its powers by considering that it 
                                                          
27 Summary of the Svenska case available at 
http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=889&seule=1 
28 Alex Uff, “Pyramids remembered in Paris”, Global Arbitration Review, Vol. 7 Issue 4 (17 July 
2012) available at http://www.arbitrationacademy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/17-7-
12-Pyramids-in-Paris.pdf 
29
 Hazel Fox “Sovereign immunity and arbitration” in Julian DM Lew, Contemporary  Problems 
in International Arbitration, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1987) p. 323 
22 
 
had jurisdiction over the Government of Turkmenistan, although it was not a 
party to the underlying contract. This judgment was reversed by the US Court 
of Appeal, which held that “the Government acted as the alter ego of Turkmenneft 
in regard to this Joint Venture Agreement with Bridas”. The Court came to this 
conclusion after examining all the relevant actions on behalf of the 
Government of Turkmenistan, which evidenced that “the Government, as 
Turkmenneft's owner, made it impossible for the objectives of the joint venture to be 
carried out”. 
4. Waiver of immunity 
4.1. Arbitration agreement as a waiver of immunity 
Waiver of immunity means the act of giving up the right against self-
discrimination and proceeding to testify30. Waiver may occur, inter alia, in a 
treaty, in a diplomatic communication, by actual submission to the 
proceeding in the local courts or in an arbitration agreement. Indeed, 
arbitrators and courts alike have ruled that a State’s submission to arbitration 
evidences an explicit or implicit waiver of sovereign immunity at the 
jurisdictional level31. It is contended that State immunity does not prevent 
State or State entity from agreeing to submit to the authority of an arbitral 
tribunal32. But when the State agrees to an arbitration clause, it “waives its 
immunity from jurisdiction vis-à-vis both the arbitral tribunal and the local courts 
are competent to exercise judicial review and supervision over the arbitral 
proceedings”33. Consequently, after the signing of an arbitration agreement or 
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of a contract containing an arbitration clause, the State or State entity cannot 
claim immunity in order to avoid participating in the arbitration proceedings.  
Pursuant to another view, the subjection of a State or State entity to the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal does not violate their immunity, because 
the arbitral tribunal does not exercise sovereign powers, unlike to the courts. 
An arbitral tribunal in contrary to the court of a forum State does not derive 
its powers or jurisdiction from statutory provisions but from the arbitration 
agreement entered into by the parties.  Therefore, because of the absence of 
sovereign powers, which is the basis of the doctrine of State immunity, it is 
supported that this doctrine should not be relevant in relation to the exercise 
of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal34. 
The issue when an arbitration agreement is binding and valid waiver of 
immunity divided the jurisprudence.  In Tekno-Pharma v. Iran case35, the 
Swedish Supreme Court held that Iran could invoke immunity, regardless the 
fact that an arbitration agreement was signed between the parties, because the 
quoted arbitration clause was not equal to an explicit waiver of immunity. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of 
Greece granted absolute immunity from suit to the Kingdom of Greece, which 
had agreed to arbitrate all contract claims arising from the transaction36.  
On contrary, in Libyan American Oil Company v Libya case37, the 
Swedish Court of Appeal found that Libya, by the approval of arbitration 
clause, had waived its immunity. In this case, one of the judges demonstrated 
the problematic around the plea of State immunity after the conclusion of an 
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arbitration agreement as follows: “It has become even more common during recent 
years that States and State-owned organs act as parties to agreements of a commercial 
nature. If such agreements provide for arbitration, it is shocking per se that one of the 
contacting parties later refuses to participate in the arbitration or to respect a duly 
rendered award. When a State party is concerned, it is therefore a natural 
interpretation to consider that said party, in accepting the arbitration clause, 
committed itself not to obstruct the arbitral proceedings or their consequences by 
invoking immunity”38. In another case39, the arbitral tribunal justified its 
competence, rejecting the plea of immunity on the basis of the private nature 
of the underlying transaction and not on the basis of the existence of the 
arbitration agreement.  
The legal uncertainty created by conflicting judgments was restored in 
many jurisdictions by the legislative determination of the arbitration 
agreement as a valid method to waive jurisdictional immunity. For example, 
section 1605(a)(6) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 1976 
provides as follows: “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case…..in which the action is 
brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the 
benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have 
arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award 
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate”. In relation with English law, 
the 1978 Act, Section 9 provides that “Where a State has agreed in writing to 
submit a dispute which has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not 
immune as respects proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom which relate to 
the arbitration”. Furthermore, according to article 17 of UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and their Property, if a State enters into 
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an agreement in writing with a foreign natural or juridical person to submit to 
arbitration differences relating to a commercial transaction, that State cannot 
invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State.  Similarly, 
article 12 of European Convention on State Immunity provides that “Where a 
Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a dispute which has 
arisen or may arise out of a civil or commercial matter, that State may not claim 
immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State on the 
territory or according to the law of which the arbitration has taken or will take place 
in respect of any proceedings relating to: the validity or interpretation of the 
arbitration agreement; the arbitration procedure; the setting aside of the award, unless 
the arbitration agreement otherwise provides”.  
4.2. Waiver of immunity and enforcement of arbitral awards  
Immunity from execution or immunity from enforcement measures is 
distinct from jurisdictional immunity. The fact that a national court can have 
jurisdiction with regard to acta jure gestionis of a foreign State does not 
necessarily imply that measures of constraint can be taken40. Immunity from 
jurisdiction refers to a limitation of the adjudicatory power of national courts, 
whereas immunity from execution restricts the enforcement powers of 
national courts or other organs41. In République islamique d'Iran, 
Organisation pour les investissements et les aides économiques et techniques 
de l'Iran (O.I.A.E.T.I.) et Organisation de l'énergie atomique de l'Iran 
(O.E.A.I.) v. Sociétés Eurodif et Sofidif et Commissariat à l'énergie atomique 
case42, the Paris Court of Appeal held that "immunity from execution is not 
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absolute and can be exceptionally discarded when the property seized is affected by the 
willingness of the foreign state, the realization of a purely commercial transaction 
pursued by himself or by a organization he created for this purpose" .  Therefore, the 
States have the capability to waive their immunity from execution. Generally, 
a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not encompass a waiver of 
immunity from enforcement measures, rather a separate waiver is required 
for that purpose 43. Nevertheless, there are judgments, which do not support 
this view. A landmark decision was issued by US District Court of Columbia 
in Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya case44. LIAMCO commenced an action before the District Court of 
Columbia to enforce an arbitral award against People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. During the court proceedings Libya claimed that the District 
Court lack jurisdiction because of State immunity. The District Court of 
Columbia rejected Libya’s jurisdictional argument and found that Libya had 
waived its defence of sovereign immunity for the purpose of the FSIA by 
expressly agreeing to the specific amendments to the arbitration and choice of 
law clauses in the deeds of concession45. The waiver of immunity from 
enforcement measures must be explicit and unequivocal. This is the view 
adopted, for instance, by the Paris Court of Appeal in Société Noga v. Russian 
Federation case46. In Court’s decision it is stated that “the simple statement in 
the contracts in dispute that ‘the borrower waives all rights of immunity with regard 
to the execution of the arbitral award rendered against it in relation to this contract’ 
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did not manifest an unequivocal intention on the part of the borrower State to waive 
in favor of its private contractual partner, its right to rely on immunity.” Though, 
according to relevant court decisions, the waiver of immunity from 
enforcement can also be implied. In Ipitrade Intl S.A. v Federal Republic of 
Nigeria47, the US District Court found that by signing the New York 
Convention 1958 Nigeria waived immunity from execution and had to have 
contemplated the confirmation and enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
framework of the Convention48. Moreover, in Creighton v Qatar case49 the 
Cour de Cassation held that Qatar waived its immunity from execution 
because the agreement to submit their dispute to an International Chamber of 
Commerce tribunal equalled to waiver of immunity from execution due to the 
fact that at that time article 24 of the ICC Arbitration Rules provided that: “by 
submitting the dispute to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the parties shall be deemed 
to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award without delay and to have waived 
their right to any form of appeal in so far as such waiver was validly made”. 
As in jurisdictional immunity, the absolute and restrictive approach of 
State immunity principle have also been applied at the stage of execution of 
arbitral award and the restrictive approach prevailed, at the end. In 
Szczesniak v. Backer et Consorts case50, the Brussels Court of Appeal held that 
foreign States acting as private persons are not exempt from enforcement 
measures to secure claims. In a very recent decision51 the English Supreme 
Court held that States cannot claim immunity when facing enforcement in 
England of foreign adverse judgments in commercial cases. This case related 
to bonds issued by the Republic of Argentina and bought by NML in respect 
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of which, together with all its other debt, Argentina declared a moratorium in 
December 2001. Between June 2001 and September 2003 affiliates of NML 
purchased, at a little over half their face value, bonds with a principal value of 
US$ 172,153,000 (“the bonds”). On 11 May 2006, NML, as beneficial owner, 
obtained summary judgment on the bonds for a total, including interest, of 
US$ 284,184,632.30, in a Federal Court in New York. Later, NML sought to 
execute the judgment of New York Court in UK, by bringing a common law 
action on that decision, which was accepted by Commercial Court. Court of 
Appeal reversed that judgment supporting that Argentina was protected by 
State immunity. Basically, two main issues were raised before the Supreme 
Court; (1) whether the proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment could be 
considered as “proceedings relating to a commercial transaction” within the 
meaning of section 3 (1) (a) of the 1978 Act, which provides that “a State is not 
immune as respects proceedings relating to—(a)a commercial transaction entered into 
by the State”; (2) whether section 31 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Act 198252 provides an alternative scheme for restricting state immunity in the 
case of foreign judgments. The members of the Supreme Court divided on the 
first issue and by a majority three to two the Supreme Court decided that 
section 3 of the 1978 Act did not extend to enforcement of foreign judgments. 
On the contrary, on the second issue the Supreme Court decided 
unanimously that State immunity could not be raised as a bar to the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment if, under the principles of 
international law recognised in the UK, the state against whom the judgment 
was given was not entitled to immunity in respect of the claim53. 
                                                          
52
 Section 31 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides in relevant part, as 
follows: “(1) A judgment given by a court of an overseas country against a state other than 
the United Kingdom or the state to which that court belongs shall be recognised and 
enforced in the United Kingdom if and only if…(a) it would be so recognised and enforced if it 
had not been given against a state; and (b) that court would have had jurisdiction in the 
matter if it had applied rules corresponding to those applicable to such matters in the United 
Kingdom in accordance with sections 2 to 11 of the State Immunity Act 1978” –available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/27 
53
 See comments on that decision under the title: “UK Supreme Court:sovereign immunity 
judgment” available at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/ 
54793/uk-supreme-court-sovereign-immunity-judgment 
29 
 
Although the restrictive approach is the prevailing, in a very recent 
decision there the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong applied the absolute 
approach in Congo case54, by ruling clearly that an arbitration clause will not 
act as an implied waiver of the jurisdiction of the courts of Hong Kong in 
relation to the enforcement of an arbitral Award by the courts. At a very 
fundamental level, the Court of Appeal has engaged in judicially deciding the 
type of sovereign immunity principle applicable in Hong Kong, which should 
be decided by the executive branch of government55, which is responsible for 
foreign affairs relating to Hong Kong. The reason for applying the absolute 
approach in the stage of execution can be justified by the fact that “enforcement 
against State property constitutes a greater interference with State’s freedom to 
manage its own affairs and to pursue its public purposes than does the 
pronouncement of a judgment or order by a national Court of another State”56. 
The decisive criterion for denying or accepting the enforcement of an 
arbitral award is the purpose of the object of execution. If the assets, that are 
going to be attached, satisfy official or sovereign purposes, then the arbitral 
award cannot be enforced. As it was clearly stated in Parlement Belge case: 
"The principle ...is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence of every 
sovereign authority,...each and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts 
any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person, of any sovereign or ambassador of 
any other State, or over the public property of any State which is destined to public 
use..."57.  Similarly, in Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case58, the German 
Constitutional Court stated that “there is a general rule of international law that 
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execution by the State having jurisdiction on the basis of a judicial writ of execution 
against a foreign State, issued in relation to non-sovereign action (acta iure gestionis) 
of that State upon that State’s things located or occupied within the national territory 
of the State having jurisdiction, is inadmissible without assent by the foreign State, 
insofar as those things serve sovereign purposes of the foreign State at the time of 
commencement of the enforcement measure”. The German Court’s position was 
followed by the Court of Rotterdam, which in Azeta case held that “- pursuant 
to an (unwritten) international law – a foreign State is entitled to immunity from 
execution when execution measures are employed against the state concerned 
involving the attachment of property intended for the public service of that State. 
Establishing, maintaining and running embassies is an essential part of the function 
of government and hence of the public service. Moneys intended for the performance 
of this function must therefore be treated as property intended for the public 
service”59. 
As evidenced by the Dutch Court’s judgment and many other judgments, 
the diplomatic assets became many times the target of execution. Diplomatic 
buildings and any kind of property serving diplomatic functions are the 
paradigmatic examples of property serving non-commercial purposes and 
thus being immune from execution60. The aforementioned NML case61 
occupied also the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters 
(Cour de cassation)62, which held that the waiver of immunity, contained in the 
relevant financial contracts did not cover diplomatic assets, that were firstly 
attached by NML Capital and, therefore, the attachments were void.  The 
Supreme Court justified this position by explaining that diplomatic 
immunity is governed by special rules which require a waiver to be both 
express and specific. On the contrary, in Russian Federation v. FJS case, the 
Swedish Supreme Court rejected a State immunity claim as grounds for 
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refusing the enforcement of an arbitral award through the attachment of real 
property that had been used mainly to house non-diplomats, but also to store 
diplomatic documents as well as a few diplomatic cars.  The main issue was 
whether either the Russian real property itself or the rental payments which it 
received from the tenants of the property were attachable to satisfy a 
monetary award not connected to the property63. The Court did not recognise 
State immunity, explaining that limited diplomatic use is not alone enough to 
guarantee State immunity. 
The State immunity in relation with public property is clearly enshrined in 
several national legislations and international treaties with some exceptions. 
In particular,  19 of UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
their Property provides that execution, against property of a State may be 
taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State only if 
the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: 
(i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written 
contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written 
communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or only if the 
State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim 
which is the object of that proceeding; or only if it has been established that 
the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other 
than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State 
of the forum, provided that post-judgment measures of constraint may only 
be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which 
the proceeding was directed. Similarly, article 23 of the European Convention 
on State Immunity allows measures of execution against the property of a 
State taken in the territory of another State to the extent that the State has 
expressly consented thereto in writing in any particular case. From the 
provisions of the aforementioned Conventions it is clearly stated that no 
implicit waiver of immunity from enforcement can be accepted.  
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The necessity of an explicit and unconditional consent only for execution 
measures against State property, which is for the time being in use or 
intended for use for commercial purposes, is also provided in section 13 (3) of 
UK State Immunity Act 1978. According to the relevant provisions 
enforcement measures can be sought “with the written consent of the State 
concerned; and any such consent (which may be contained in a prior agreement) may 
be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded as a consent for the 
purposes of this subsection”. On contrary, the FSIA accepts as valid also the 
implied waiver of immunity from enforcement measures against State 
property used only for commercial activity in USA. More specifically, section 
1610 (1) (a) of FSIA provides that “the property in the United States of a foreign 
state,…….., used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a 
court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if (1) the 
foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from 
execution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the 
waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of 
the waiver….”. 
Part II  The States’ and State entities’ capacity for arbitration 
The capacity for arbitration is linked with the issue of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. As the Swiss Federal Tribunal haw explained: “The 
question of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal also comprises the question of the 
subjective scope of the arbitration agreement. Whether all parties to the proceedings 
are bound to it is a question of their capacity to be a party to the arbitration 
proceedings and thus a prerequisite for a decision on the merits or the admissibility [of 
the claims]…”64. “Considering that “a State’s submission to arbitration evidences 
an explicit or implicit waiver of sovereign immunity at the jurisdictional level”65, in 
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some States, there are domestic provisions, which restrict the State’s or State 
entity’s capacity to agree to arbitration. In this case, restrictions on a State’s 
entitlement to enter into arbitration agreements are justified “by the old concept 
that it is against sovereign dignity to submit to any type of dispute resolution system 
not controlled by the state itself”66.  It is supported that restrictions on State’s 
capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement do not raise issues of capacity 
but instead relate to issues of arbitrability. This view is criticized with the 
argument that the relevant legislative provisions all purportedly concern the 
power or right of particular types of entities (eg States and State entities) to 
conclude binding contracts and that this sort of rule falls relatively clearly 
within classic definitions of legal capacity67. However, the invocation of these 
restrictions from the side of a State or a State entity, after the conclusion of an 
arbitration agreement, “can lead to abuses of public power where the State party 
attempts unjustifiably to frustrate or deny a contract”68. 
1.Examining the capacity of State and State entities to conclude 
arbitration agreements 
1.1.The applicable law for determining State’s and State entity’s capacity 
for arbitration 
Article V (1) (a) of the 1958 New York Convention provides that 
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused when the parties to 
an arbitration agreement were under the law applicable to them under some 
incapacity. In contrast to New York Convention the UNCITRAL Model Law 
does not make any reference at all to the choice of applicable law governing 
issues of capacity. In particular, according to article 34 (2) (a) (i) of Model Law 
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an arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if  the party making the 
application furnishes proof that a party to the arbitration agreement “was 
under some incapacity”. The question which law is applicable for 
determining the capacity of a State or State entity to enter into arbitration 
agreement has not been answered in the same way in theory.  
According to one view, the capacity of a State to bind itself by an 
arbitration agreement is a question governed by its own legislation69. Indeed, 
the choice of law rule applies to the capacity to enter into a valid arbitration 
agreement. Under the choice of law rule, the capacity to contract is governed 
by the personal law of the party in question70. On the other hand, it is 
supported that once a State party has accepted arbitration in a contract, even 
if its domestic law prohibits it to conclude binding arbitration agreements,  
“both the capacity to contract and to enter into an arbitral agreement are governed by 
an “internationalized” lex contractus or lex arbitrii (and not by the personal law of 
the parties, including the state party)….Therefore, no account is taken on national 
public law governing the contracting powers of States and any ensuing limitations 
(including constitutional  and administrative law limitations) on contracting and on 
the entry into an arbitration agreement”71. In Benteler v. Belgium case, the lex 
contractus (but not in its aforementioned “internationalized” form) was 
considered to be the governing law of the capacity of State and State entities. 
As it is stated in the relevant Preliminary Award “with respect to State or 
parastatal entities in international contracts, the capacity of the State or its 
subdivisions to conclude arbitration agreements is governed by the proper law of the 
contract rather than the internal law of the State”72.  
Whatever the law applicable is for the determination of a State’s capacity 
to enter into arbitration agreement, it is generally accepted that “international 
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ordre public would vigorously reject the proposition that a State organ, dealing with 
foreigners having openly, with knowledge and intent concluded an arbitration clause 
that inspires the co-contractant’s confidence could thereafter, whether in the 
arbitration or in execution proceedings invoke the nullity of its own promise”73. The 
opinion that international public order disapproves the practice of States to 
rely ex post on their internal law and to claim invalidity of an arbitration 
agreement due to their incapacity is adopted by several court decisions. 
Indicatively Paris Court of Appeal held that “whatever the basis, the prohibition 
of a State to submit to arbitration is limited to domestic agreements and is not part of 
international public policy, which on the contrary prohibits a public entity from 
invoking restrictive provisions of its own national law or the law of the contract in 
order to evade arbitration a posteriori”. 74 
The reliance on State’s and State entity’s incapacity in order to avoid their 
obligations derived from an arbitration agreement equals to abuse of private 
counterparty’s good faith. Therefore, if the counterparty showed the required 
diligence and was in good faith at the time of arbitration agreement’s 
conclusion, then the State or State entity cannot invoke incapacity. There is a 
very important decision of Cour de Cassation in Lizardi case, related to the 
matter of the validity of a contract, in case that one of the parties is incapable 
of signing the contract and the other party acts in good faith75. Pursuant to the 
facts of this case, a Mexican bought jewels in Paris but refused to pay 
invoking his lack of capacity under Mexican law, whereas under French law 
was considered to be an adult and, therefore, capable to conclude the sale 
contract. The Cour de Cassation held as follows: “……in this case, the French 
can not be required to know the laws of the various nations of their provisions 
concerning in particular the minority, the majority and the extent of liabilities that 
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may be taken by foreigners to the extent of their civil capacity; then it is sufficient for 
the validity of the contract, that the French have treated without levity, without 
negligence and in good faith76”. 
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions which reflect the 
general assumption that a State or State entity cannot rely on its national law 
to escape its obligation arising from an arbitration agreement in an 
international contract. For example, article 177 (2) of the Swiss PILA provides 
that “if a party to arbitration agreement is a State or an enterprise or organization 
controlled by it, it cannot rely on its own law in order to contest its capacity to be a 
party to an arbitration or the arbitrability of the dispute covered by an arbitration 
agreement”77. Moreover, European Convention clarifies the ambiguity and 
confusion that exists as to the capacity of States and State entities to enter into 
an arbitration agreement by providing in article II (1) that “legal persons 
considered by the law which is applicable to them as legal persons of public law have 
the right to conclude valid arbitration agreements”78. Therefore, in cases, which 
fall into the scope of European Convention, States and State entities cannot 
invoke national legislation that is contrary to European Convention, which 
has superior regulatory power. 
1.2.Lack of power of State’s and State entity’s apparent representative 
Another skilful way of resisting to arbitration to which State or a State 
entity had previously agreed is the invocation of the absence of representative 
power of the person signing the agreement and, therefore, the lack of any 
commitment by the State or State entity. It is almost impossible for the 
contracting private party to know the national provisions governing the 
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executive duties and responsibilities of each member of the Government and 
the statutory provisions of State entities regulating the bodies which have 
power of legal representation. In many cases, these provisions are not codified 
in a single legal text, but they are contained in more than one legal 
instruments. Therefore, this legislative “chaos” can create serious problems 
even to the most careful and diligent contracting private party. 
Moreover, internal law may require a designated procedure to be followed 
before or after the conclusion of arbitration agreement. Even though the 
compliance with this procedure falls within the competence and liability of 
State’s or State entity’s representatives, the person who will be “punished” in 
case of violation is the contracting private party. As already mentioned, the 
abusive use of internal law by  State and State entities led the courts and the 
arbitral tribunals to establish an internationally recognized rule that a 
Government or Governmental body cannot rely on its national law to 
invalidate an agreement of international arbitration. Consequently, “a judge or 
an arbitrator could overlook the lack of capacity of one of the parties …….or the 
absence of power of a party’s representative………if it were established that the other 
party entered into the contract in circumstances in which it could legitimately have 
been unaware  of the lack of capacity or absence of power”79. 
These views were well expressed and justified in a recent decision of 
Netherlands Supreme Court.  In this case,  Defence Industries Organisation of 
the Ministry of Defence and support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran concluded with  International Military Services a contract for the 
construction of a combat vehicles maintainance facility and agreed to submit 
disputes to ICC Arbitration. The State organisation did not pay IMS and 
violated its contractual obligations. IMS initiated arbitration proceedings, 
which took place in Hague and ended with an award against State 
organisation. Subsequently State Organisation sought an action before the 
Court of The Hague to set aside the arbitral award arguing that the arbitration 
agreement was invalid because Art. 130 of the Iranian Constitution stipulated 
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arbitration agreements between government bodies and foreign parties shall 
only be valid if approved by Parliament. Thus this approval had never been 
given. The Netherlands Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of 
Appeal, which ruled that it is an internationally recognized rule that a 
Government or Governmental body cannot rely on its national law to 
invalidate an agreement of international arbitration and that the IMS acted in 
good faith as to the capacity of Ste Organisation to enter into the arbitration 
agreement80.  
Similarly, the Cairo Court of Appeal in Organisme des Antiquitiés v G. 
Silver Night Company case ruled as follows: “`It is without doubt that such an 
allegation……..is not in conformity with the general principle of good faith in the 
performance of obligation, which does not distinguish between civil and 
administrative contracts. In addition, this runs counter to the jurisprudence and 
practice in international commercial arbitration according to which State or public 
law entities may not reject an arbitration clause contained in their contracts by 
invoking legislative restrictions, even if they are genuine……..Moreover, if public law 
persons were allowed to free themselves from arbitration clauses which they inserted 
in a contract with a foreign party, on the basis that administrative contracts cannot be 
submitted to arbitration, this would shake the confidence of parties which deal with 
such entities and could cause serious damage to foreign investment and to 
development projects”81. 
2.Enforcement of awards annulled because of State’s or State entity’s 
incapacity for arbitration  
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The capacity of a State or a State entity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement is a major issue, mainly because there is a serious possibility that  
at the time of enforcement the court may refuse to recognize and enforce the 
arbitral award if the State or State entity was under some incapacity, pursuant 
to law applicable to it. For example, in Fougerolle SA v Ministry of Defence of 
the Syrian Arab Republic case, the Administrative Tribunal of Damascus 
refused enforcement of two ICC awards holding as follows: “In the present 
case, the two awards for which enforcement is sought were rendered without the 
preliminary advice on the referral of the dispute to arbitration, which must be given 
by the competent Committee of the Council of State. Consequently, Art. 44 of the Law 
No. 55 of 1959 of the Council of State has been violated. This norm is mandatory and 
pertains to public policy. The consequence of this violation is that [the two ICC 
awards] are non-existent….”82. 
Furthermore, the problematic around State’s capacity to enter into an 
arbitration agreement gets more complicated, when the seat of arbitration is 
in this State and the competent court of the State party sets aside the arbitral 
award, by invoking to its internal law, which contains restrictions on State’s 
capacity for arbitration and on procedure of arbitration. In the light of 
European Convention the court asked for enforcement of a nullified award 
may refuse enforcement if the nullification was founded on the fact that the 
parties were under some incapacity according to their applicable law83.  
Moreover, article V (1) (e) of the 1958 New York Convention provides that 
recognition and enforcement of award may be refused if the award has been 
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which or 
under the law of which that award was made. What is the luck of this 
annulled award? Can it be recognized and enforced in other countries, under 
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article V (1) (e) of New York Convention? There is no clear answer to these 
questions. 
In Termorio case84, which concerned a Colombian state owned electrical 
utility, Electranta, U.S. Court of Appeal refused to recognize and enforce the 
arbitral award because the Colombia’s highest administrative Court, set aside 
this award on the ground that the arbitration clause violated Colombian law 
which, at the date of the agreement, did not expressly permit recourse to ICC 
arbitration. In contrast to this court’s decision, in Chromalloy case85, the U.S. 
District Court of Columbia recognized and enforced an arbitral award 
“against the state of Egypt on the basis of New York Convention, despite the fact that 
the award had been set aside by an Egyptian court where and under the law of which 
the award had been made. The federal court refused to recognize the Egyptian court’s 
decision nullifying the award, finding that to do so would violate U.S. public policy in 
favor of arbitration and reward Egypt’s breach of an express contractual provision not 
to pursue an appeal to vacate the award”. Subsequently, Chromalloy filed for 
seeking enforcement of the Egyptian arbitral award in France. Egypt invoked 
the nullification of the award by the Egyptian Court in order to stop the 
execution proceedings. Court of Appeal, in Paris ruled that French judges 
were not empowered to review the merits of the award and could refuse to 
grant exequatur only in those cases specified in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The award made in Egypt was an international award, and its existence 
remained established despite its being annulled in Egypt and its recognition 
in France was not in violation of international public policy86. 
Conclusion 
                                                          
84 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. (Colombia) v. Electranta S.P. (Colombia), Judgment of 25 May 2007 of 
U.S. Court of Appeal, District of Columbia, cited in Albert Jan van den Berg, “Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration”, Vol XXXIII 2008, Issue 29 p. 955 
85 Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Judgment of 31.07.1996 of U.S. District 
Court, District of Columbia, see also Stephen T. Ostrowsm & Yuval Shany, “CHROMALLOY: 
UNITED STATES LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AT THE CROSSROADS”, New York 
University Law Review, November 1998, p. 1650 available at 
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-73-5-Ostrowski-
Shany.pdf 
86 Kazutake OKUMA “Confirmation, Annulment, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards”, The Seinan Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2005) 
41 
 
States and State entities invoked many times (and continue invoking) 
before courts and arbitral tribunals immunity as a rule of public international 
law and incapacity to enter into arbitration as a rule of their internal law, in 
order to avoid satisfying their contractual obligations or participating in 
arbitration proceedings or to stop enforcement measures against them taken 
on the basis of an arbitral award. These claims are irreconcilable with the 
State’s obligations and principles of estoppel, when they are abusive and have 
no legal basis. 
Courts faced effectively the abusiveness of the plea of State immunity, by 
gradually adopting the restrictive approach, pursuant to which States and 
State entities are not immune before a foreign court, if the dispute refers to 
commercial transactions and not to acts of sovereignty.  In other words, if the 
State or State entity acts as a private person and deals in terms of private 
economy, it cannot invoke immunity.  
Furthermore, when arbitration evolved into a popular means of resolving 
disputes, removing cases from the courts, more and more arbitration 
agreements were concluded between States or State entities and private 
persons. These arbitration agreements are considered by the courts and 
arbitral tribunals to be a valid waiver of immunity. In relation with the 
enforcement of the arbitral awards, courts seem to be more protective towards 
States, firstly because the execution is made against State property and 
secondly in order to avoid a possible conflict with immunities derived from 
consular or diplomatic law. Therefore, the decisive criterion for allowing the 
enforcement of an arbitral award is the purpose of the object of execution. If 
the assets, that are going to be attached, satisfy official or sovereign purposes, 
then the arbitral award cannot be enforced. In these cases, it is difficult for the 
private party seeking the execution to prove that the attached assets are not 
destined for public use, but they serve commercial purposes of the State or 
State entity. 
Because of the fact that State immunity is a principle of public 
international law and every sovereign State can invoke it, private parties  
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ensure their financial interests and rights by concluding precise and explicit 
agreements, with which State or State entities waive both jurisdictional 
immunity and immunity from execution. Unfortunately, private parties 
cannot be fully protected against the plea of incapacity of the State or State 
entities to conclude arbitration agreements. Usually, the national statutory 
provisions that regulate the competences and powers of the Government’s 
members or the State entity’s Board of Directors’s members are not known to 
the private party and, in many cases, States or States do not inform the private 
parties about the existence of these provisions. Consequently, there is always 
a great risk that arbitration agreement will be declared as invalid because of 
State’s incapacity, although it is generally agreed that “it is fundamentally 
contrary to a State’s commitment to arbitrate subsequently to invoke its own 
legislative, constitutional or administrative acts as qualifications to or limitations on 
its international arbitration agreement87”.  
In addition to the legal aspect, the efforts of the States or State entities not 
to comply with the arbitration agreements and with arbitral awards rendered 
against them have also political and financial consequences. A State that 
shows inconsistency, breaches contracts without legal basis, invokes 
abusively immunity and avoids arbitration proceedings by claiming ex post 
its incapacity for arbitration is not a State with which investors and 
enterprises would cooperate. All these actions do not protect public money or 
public property. They only shake the confidence of private parties which deal 
with such States or State entities and cause serious damage to foreign 
investment and to development projects. States must respect the investors and 
the companies with which have commercial transactions and treat them as 
equals and not as subordinates. In other words, as it was beautifully stated by 
a well-known English judge: “It is more in keeping with the dignity of a foreign 
sovereign to submit himself to the rule of law than to claim to be above it”88. 
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